I Introduction
It is an honour and a privilege to deliver the Sixth Annual Lecture on Religious Liberty. My thanks to Dean Michael Quinlan and the University of Notre Dame Australia for the invitation.
In this address I wish to ask whether the protection of religious freedom is better recast as a claim for respect for freedom of conscience. If the cause of religious liberty has had its detractors of late-given the increasing odium with which organized religion is viewed by many-is the way forward to present claims as incursions upon one's liberty of conscience?
Although this may appear a more promising and stronger approach on a number of bases, it is my contention that it has serious weaknesses. Freedom of conscience may be too weak a reed. It is a valuable supplement to religious freedom, but not sufficient on its own to bear the weight and range of claims commonly advanced as religious liberty violations.
I will begin by asserting that the right of religious freedom is under increasing pressure from a number of quarters. At a popular level many express concern-sometimes in a strident fashion-that religious liberty has become a euphemistic banner for religious folk to engage in conduct that, to the critics, looks like plain bigotry and prejudice. No wonder then that, also at a popular level, some religious people respond, if not a little dramatically, that there has been a "seismic shift" in Western societies that has given birth to "today's historic explosion of intolerance towards religious believers". 1 In the quieter corridors of academia and in the pages of esoteric journals, scholars question the need for exemptions from the law of the land for religionists. They write books with disarming titles like Why Tolerate Religion? 2 They challenge the very core notion that there is anything special about religion in this secular agequestioning whether it deserves, for example, any form of privileged treatment by way of charitable status, continued inconvenient protection of doctors' and nurses' consciences, dispensation from antidiscrimination norms, and so on. To fully substantiate my argument would require another lecture 3 , so I trust you will indulge me if will simply take this-religious freedom is under greater attack-as my premise.
(or deepest beliefs) and practices are being infringed? If the word "religion" itself is increasingly odious, can we sidestep its negative connotations?
The most promising candidate for a reframing of the issue is to assess claims for religious liberty as claims for liberty of conscience. There at least three advantages conscience appears to have over religion.
Universal and inclusive
Within the context of contemporary societies marked by moral and religious diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves that must enjoy a special status, but, rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to structure their moral identity. 4 Everyone has a conscience 5 ; but not everyone has a religion. Nobody can be against conscience any more than being against ice-cream, clean air and the preservation of pandas; but plenty of people are hostile to religion-especially institutional or organized religion and conservative, traditional or countercultural faith communities.
Conscience appeals as a broader and, indeed, more universal basis than religion upon which to protect the deepest concerns citizens possess in liberal democratic societies 6 -places where a sizeable (and increasing) percentage of the population in the 21st century profess no religious affiliation. 7 Citizens who are atheists, agnostics, rationalists, free thinkers, sceptics or just plain 6 "Conscience proves a useful concept for religious freedom because, unlike religion, it seems to be a universal concept-most would agree that they have one and would prefer for it to remain unmolested. The conscience therefore provides a convenient, publically accessible stand-in for religion, which is why so many contemporary theorists favor it. It diminishes the specialness of religion, or at least it doesn't discriminate against the nonreligious by giving the believer something that is not given to the unbeliever." Jonathan Leeman, Political Church (IVP Academic) at 74-75. 7 The most recent NZ Census reported that 41. Once the definitional hurdle is out of the way, the only question of significance becomes the genuineness or sincerity of the person's (or group's) beliefs. Is their claim of conscience genuine? We need not be concerned with the content of the beliefs, but only with their sincerity.
Here the law is on much firmer ground. It has some very well-developed tests to assess the sincerity of a claim and to screen out opportunist, bogus or sham protestations.
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III Weaknesses with Freedom of Conscience-Or Why it may Fail to Deliver
Freedom of conscience initially appears superior to freedom of religion as a basis for claims.
Yet I believe it has some major drawbacks. But first, a brief look at the term "conscience" itself seems called for. In earlier times its meaning would emphasize its divine source: "the sanctuary But there are two problems. First, if forms of insidious and incessant state psychological coercion, propaganda or "indoctrination" cannot dent one's inner realm-remember, nothing can-then these, it seems, receive a pass. Paradoxically then, conscience is absolutely protected whilst simultaneously not being protected at all. Second, the factual presupposition is unsound.
The idea that "while your entire world in the public sphere might be completely demolished,
[nonetheless] your private sphere somehow remains intact" 29 is naïve and fanciful in the extreme. It rests, as Peter Petkoff notes, upon a misunderstanding of the reality of the inevitable transference or overlap between belief and action, the private and public realms.
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By contrast, the forum externum-the realm of conduct or actions that sees individuals (and groups) express or "manifest" their inner beliefs-always needs protection by the law.
Actions unlike "mere religious beliefs and opinions" can be restricted by the state. But unlike innermost thoughts-which receive unqualified and absolute protection in a hermetically If we could get conscience placed in the forum externum it would appear to be better safeguarded. It would at least get qualified protection. Can we do that? My answer is yes.
A brief digression
It is only if we go back to the early Christian understandings of conscience that see that, strictly speaking, the inner judge or voice is not conscience but rather something called synderesis.
Christian theologians beginning with Jerome, but most fully developed by St Thomas Aquinas, drew a distinction between synderesis and conscientia. 32 The inner faculty or "spark" that illuminates every human being, and always habitually inclines them towards good and away from evil, is synderesis. By contrast, conscientia comes after synderesis and is the application of that understanding or light to particular concrete circumstances. Robert Vischer puts it well:
"Although a person's faculty of apprehension was called 'synderesis,' only the faculty of application-action derived from apprehension-received the label 'conscientia.'"
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Whilst synderesis is infallible and cannot be extinguished, people can, through their free will, and the exercise of judgment, act in a way contrary to the dictates of syndersis. The conscientia is free and can err; but synderesis is not free, and it always points to the good, is intrinsically upright and so cannot err. 34 The Catechism of the Catholic Church refers to this duality as follows:
Conscience includes the perception of the principles of morality (synderesis): their application in the given circumstances by practical discernment of reasons and goods; and finally, judgment about concrete acts yet to be performed or already performed. correctly then it might receive a darn sight more protection.
The Rise of the Unanchored Conscience
In modern usage, the notion of conscience is a truncated or distorted one. It retains the idea of an inner voice. But the inner voice is not an infallible, unerring one, and the speaker is not articulating "the principles of morality" (as the Catholic Catechism terms it), the universal basic moral law, 36 the natural law 37 -or, more simply-the speaker is not God. Rather, the inner judge is really the autonomous self's best grasp of the good and right, an individual's "culturally influenced, personally generated, subjectively held moral opinions. Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience. Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century, it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of and could not have mistaken for it they had. It is the right of self-will. Conscience is no longer the "stern monitor" (as Newman called it) imposing duties that originate from outside the individual. Instead, it has become "the writer of permission slips" based upon one's earnest feelings. The secularization of the concept of conscience 43 is thus complete, and so we should not be surprised that "one critical element is completely missing:
namely the idea that conscience is an echo of the voice of God in man or a manifestation of divine law." Of course, this secularization is perfect for a secular liberal polity that puts a premium on personal autonomy.
The Implications of the Unanchored Conscience
Does it matter that conscience today is not connected to, or constrained, by the objective moral order, however that is defined? Does it matter the individual conscience is "radically subjectivist" 44 , "the faculty of subjective moral judgment" 45 and its decisions cannot be gainsaid as "erroneous"-as long as they be sincere and authentic? 46 I believe so.
Unpredictable claims and unpalatable outcomes
First, it can give rise to an expanding number of claims over some highly-contentious activities, not to mention, at times, some perverse or outlandish outcomes. 47 The most flagrant historical example is perhaps those Nazis, such as Adolf Eichmann, who had no problems with conscience despite supervising the sending of millions to the gas chambers. 48 Perhaps it is more accurate to say that, as Hannah Arendt so persuasively argued, Eichmann's conscience was warped by his peers and Third Reich society:
His conscience was indeed set at rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with which "the good society" everywhere reacted as he did. He did not "close his ears to the voice of conscience," as the judgment has it, not because he had none, but because his conscience spoke with a 'respectable voice," with the voice of respectable society around him. attaching freedom of conscience to autonomy may have the effect of both transforming and trivializing the commitment. In its formative period, after all, the commitment to freedom of conscience rested precisely on a belief that people are not autonomous, but rather are dependent on-and obligated by-a higher and personal Power. That belief was what justified special respect for people who were acting not just from the normal mundane motives, and certainly not as autonomous agents, but from conscience. Dissolving conscience into autonomy turns conscience on its head and deprives it of this justification for special respect.
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The lower status of conscience compared to religion may, as Paul Horwitz astutely argues, rebound against claimants when tribunals conduct the usual balancing exercise whereby countervailing interests are weighed against the claimant's cause:
Despite how seriously our constitutional culture treats claims of conscience, it is much easier to disregard a claim that rests on individual conscience than one that rests of absolute truth, or to conclude that such a claim, if it rests on conscience alone, can be outweighed by more immediate and worldly considerations. and which are being re-enacted, in a more modest way to be sure, here today.) The decisionmakers can at least imagine the possible truth of religious beliefs and practices, 59 viz, the believer maybe did hear from a deity, to whom her or she might one day account to.
By contrast, a claim of conscience-at least as conscience is currently understoodseems far less compelling. Recall that the unanchored conscience has undergone a transmogrification into a matter of personal autonomy, an expression of self-will. In the modern era, the claim of conscience is no longer concerned with the truth or content of the claim, but simply whether it is sincere. As Horwitz puts it "claims are viewed as important primarily because the person believes them to be true, not because they are (or may be) true." 60 Or, to be even blunter, the claim "is viewed as having less to do with the truth than with a feeling in someone's head." 
Ill-suited to collective or institutional beliefs and practices
The modern understanding of conscience centres upon its critical role in personal and individual decision-making. That seems to make the claims of freedom of conscience by religious communities and institutions tenuous, if not ruled out entirely. 62 It seems a stretch to say a religious corporation qua corporation has a conscience.
Admittedly we sometimes do see exemptions for religious institutions in recognition that they might hold a distinct "moral identity" or "mission". employers" from segments of the compulsory coverage of employees, specifically coverage that included contraceptives having an abortion-like operation. 63 (The issue in the case was whether for-profit "close" companies owned by religious persons could assert a religious freedom claim. 64 ) But "moral identity" is not the same as conscience. More on that soon.
Conscience, whilst it looks capacious, may actually be under-inclusive. 65 Some claims that are presently recognized as religious liberty ones may not fit under the conscience umbrella. Andrew Koppelman rightly points out that "'conscience' is a poor characterization of the desire of a church to expand its building to be able to hold its growing congregation as There is a clear need to recapture the relational dimension of conscience-the notion that the dictates of conscience are defined, articulated and lived out in relationship with others…. As such conscience cannot be explained as a free standing individual construct. It might be expressed and defined by the individual, but its substance and real-world implications are relational by their very nature. Cultivating and maintaining the conditions necessary for these relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if we are serious about freedom of conscience.
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If individuals' consciences are nurtured and empowered by relationships, then, argues
Vischer, the groups and associations that foster these relationships deserve cultivating too. But can we say a group has its own freestanding conscience independent from its members? Here even Vischer (despite penning an entire book devoted to expanding our understanding of the role of conscience) shrinks back: "It is more sensible to say that groups can serve as vehicles for conscience and that, although the relational nature of conscience makes such groups essential to conscience's flourishing, a group's distinct moral identity is built on the moral content of its members' consciences." 71 And later, " the corporation is a moral agent with the capacity for exercising a robust institutional conscience-not in the sense that the corporation serves as a conscience-wielding being, but in the sense that the corporation serves as a venue and a vehicle for the sharing of conscience-driven claims among its constituents." 72 So a group's conscience, if we want to use that expression, is simply the aggregation of all its member's individual consciences. Groups and corporations may possess a moral identity (a reputation or "brand", to put it crassly), but not a conscience.
Aside from being ill-suited to catch group claims, Koppelman is surely right that a lot of commonplace religious practice is engaged in "out of habit, adherence to custom, a need to cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation and guilt, curiosity about religious truth" 73 and so Division v Smith (the peyote case) neither of the religious freedom claimants-who sought to use peyote, a controlled drug, as a sacrament in their Native American Church-was motivated, it seems, by his conscience. One was motivated primarily by his interest in exploring his Native American ethnic identity, and the other was merely curious about the Church.
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Difficult clashes of conscience
If one citizen's conscientious judgment is as valid as another's, then there is no obvious unimpeachable way to adjudicate between them. 75 In another age, and in homogenous societies, we might expect the vast majority of citizens to have a similar understanding of synderesis.
The opportunities for disputes based on different applications of moral judgment (conscientia)
would be still present-for the application of one's grasp of the moral law to concrete circumstances can err. The inner voice can be ignored because of "the habitual inclination towards vice and the impetuousness of passion." 76 But clashes would be relatively few given a similar shared apprehension of the moral law (synderesis). Now, however, many have abandoned a commitment to any kind of transcendent objective order, eschewed reliance upon an external moral law-synderesis has been forgotten, rejected or discarded. Others may hold to a synderesis, but not the synderesis. 77 Liberal democracies are marked by moral and religious pluralism and citizens adhere to different worldviews. If conscience is the touchstone and our consciences are rooted in, or have developed from, completely different starting points, we should not be surprised that conflicts will be frequent.
My conscience tells me I cannot participate in same-sex weddings; your conscience tells you that you must follow your heart and marry your object d'amour or, as an employer, you must not allow your employees to discriminate against same-sex couples. Whose conscience is more likely to win the day? 78 Sometimes the conflict will be between the government and the individual-as in the classic instance of a military draft law imposed upon 74 Ibid. 75 The gravamen of Arthur Allen Leff's classic article, "Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law" [1979] Duke LJ 1129. 76 Somme, "Indestructibility of synderesis", at 408. The conscience can err in four ways: through insufficient experience; through insufficient skill in reasoning; through inattention; and through the perversion of reasoning: Budzsizewski, "Handling Issues of Conscience", at 5-6. 77 There can, in the nature of things, be only one synderesis and thus to speak of a multiplicity of universal moral laws (plural) would be a contradiction in terms. 78 Leeman, Political Church, at 91. a pacifist. Increasingly, however, the clash will be between non-state actors, each driven by conscience. 79 Will the eventual victor in such disputes be the claimant whose conscience is more attuned to the prevailing ideologies of the day? Will it dependent upon the prevailing orthodoxy or worldview of those in positions of power and influence?
Reliance upon conscience as a stand-in for religion is fine (from the believers' standpoint) where-in a former age-virtually everyone understood conscience (or at least synderesis) the same way. But, as Jonathan Leeman, insightfully notes
In a nation of believers and unbelievers, the unattached, unaccountable conscience will be employed to legitimize the freedom of various religions (institutionally defined) only as long as the conscience of a nation's decisionmakers value them. When a nation's decision makers decide that the traditional (substantivist) institutional religions are a threat to liberty or equality or tolerance, they will banish them, first from the public square, then from the market place, and perhaps, in partial ways, from the home ("No, you may not indoctrinate your children"). The plaintiff, Gareth Lee, a homosexual activist, ordered a cake from a Belfast bakery. 87 The icing on Mr Lee's cake would have the words "Support Gay Marriage", the logo of them with a defence were rejected. They contended that to accept the order would have forced them to violate their conscience by endorsing a cultural phenomenon (same-sex marriage) that they did not, based on their sincere religious convictions, agree with. 88 It was to no avail. The
Court of Appeal in Belfast agreed and the case is set down to be heard in the Supreme Court. 89 Some American scholars are worried at what they discern to be this entire new breed of exemption claims, which they call "complicity-based conscience claims"-requests to be exempt from having to be complicit in others' immoral activities, or from having to facilitate them. Professors Nejaime and Siegel explain:
Complicity claims are faith claims about how to live in community with others who do not share the claimant's beliefs and whose lawful conduct the person of faith believes to be sinful. Because these claims are explicitly oriented toward third parties, they present special concerns about third party harms. 90 It is hard to find much in the way of direct adverse material or economic consequences to the other (third) party arising from the granting of legal exemptions: few would-be consumers would be denied the goods or services, or be forced to incur considerable time and cost to secure them elsewhere. Certainly, Mr Lee had many other bakeries in Belfast to ice his cake. Absent some sort of local monopoly, or the objecting provider being a remote rural area, there are nearly always other providers available to service the needs of the consumers rebuffed.
Accordingly, critics turned their attention to the emergence of "dignitary harms": an accommodation granted by the state to the claimants, they contend, sends an adverse social signal, one with the power to stigmatize 91 those who engage in the conduct in question (progressive, enlightened, liberal citizens) have finally triumphed when it comes to LGBT rights, reproductive rights, and so on. But the conflict is stubbornly kept alive when the state is willing to grant exemptions to recalcitrant citizens who refuse to move with the times. Thus, for example, Nejaime and Siegel lament: "The network of conscience exemptions that the antiabortion movement seeks to enact functions like other laws pressed by the movement: it impedes access to abortion." 93 Well, that might not be the prime aim of the claimants pressing their conscientious objection-they simply want to be excused-but they would be more than pleased with this broad societal "side-effect".
Here is my point. The dignitary harm notion is, I believe, an overly broad and fuzzy conception of what constitutes harm to others. When we move away from direct, tangible harms to diffuse, indirect, psychological ones, the potential to severely shrink the scope for protection of conscience is clear. 94 It confuses what is at the heart of the accommodation by the state: an exemption from facilitating certain conduct engaged in by third parties-not a governmental statement about the third parties' character, integrity, or moral worth. 95 Surely, one can decline to participate in an activity that one finds directly contrary to one's conscience without this meaning that you personally view the third parties as "sinners", or as persons possessing less dignity. Can one still hate the sin and not the sinner? 96 Professor Douglas Laycock has, in my view, written a devastating critique of the entire complicity claim thesis. 97 First, talk of dignitary harms is really another way of saying that denied customers will be offended. 98 Offence per se is never a sufficient ground to suppress conduct or free speech under American constitutional law. 99 Outside the US, the recognition of a right not to be offended has some currency but, in my view, this is yet another instance where its merits are seriously wanting.
Next, the talk of dignitary harm is seriously one-sided. It ignores the hurt suffered by suppliers whose consciences tell them not to carry through with this proposed action. "Those seeking exemption," Laycock explains patiently, "believe that they are being asked to defy
God's will, disrupting the most important relationship in their lives, a relationship with an omnipotent being who controls their fates." should it obscure the fact that the objector believes her or she-not just the other person-is doing something that is deeply wrong. The McArthurs, the owners of Ashers Bakery, felt they would be doing something quite wrong. Laycock deftly alters the facts of Hobby Lobby to make this point. Recall that there, the Greens, the owners of the craft stores, objected to contracting and paying for employees' contraceptive coverage that included prepaid abortifacients.
If the Greens provided a prepaid heroin benefit to their employees, or a prepaid prostitution benefit, would they be doing wrong just by offering it, tempting their employees to use it? Or would they merely be complicit in the wrongdoing of those employees who chose to take advantage of the benefit? It is not a line worth drawing, and characterizing it one way or the other does not change the moral stakes.
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Precisely.
100 Ibid at 378. See also De Girolami, "Free Exercise By Moonlight", at 142 and Walsh, "Same-Sex Marriage", at 127. 101 Laycock, "Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups", at 382. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid at 383.
There is a strange and unwarranted type of zero-sum game mentality here: 104 if the state grants these claimants an exemption, it must somehow detract from the would-be customers' rights and cast aspersions upon their conduct. If such an artificial interpretation of harm were to be accepted, it would eradicate a great many conscience-based claims for exemption.
More worryingly, there is also a vaguely totalitarian air to the dignitary harm theory, whose implementation would see the state brook no dissent from newly-established legal norms. It seems to say: not only must citizens tolerate their fellow citizen's conduct, they must go along with and facilitate it-and if they refrain from doing so, the state will not hear of it.
The liberal democratic state begins to take on a totalitarian character to the extent it is "not satisfied with passive obedience; it demands full co-operation from the cradle to the grave." [T]he claim for accommodation is not simply an act of withdrawal. Instead, in advancing complicity-based claims for exemption, mobilized groups and individuals may seek to enforce traditional norms against those who do not share their beliefs. Accommodation of these claims may undermine, rather than advance, pluralistic values.
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Nothing, it seems, must stand in the way of what is described tendentiously as "pluralistic values." Here at last we get to what is, I suggest, at the heart of their objection: exemptions for conscience-at least for moral or religious conservatives-keep the culture battle alive.
V Concluding Thoughts
Sole reliance and the complete re-framing of religious freedom claims as freedom of conscience claims is unwise. Although the right to liberty of conscience appears to do the same work, it simply does not. In certain respects, it is narrower than the right to religious freedom. Placing all one's faith eggs in the conscience basket is risky.
If I am correct then it seems we are back to the right of religious freedom again-albeit supplemented by the right of conscience. We are back to the task of justifying again why we should protect religious liberty. I think Michael Stokes Paulsen is right: "[r]espect for religious
